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# STATE RESEARCH

**BULLETIN  
No. 20**

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**POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES – NATO EXERCISES**

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**NEWS &  
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**RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE  
UNDER THREAT**

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Severe restrictions on the right of assembly — demonstrations, marches and pickets — will shortly be imposed if the government follows recent recommendations of the Commons Home Affairs Committee and a draft 'code of civic government' published by the Scottish Office.

In its report on the law relating to public order the Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee recommends changes to the law, mainly the Public Order Act 1936, which would significantly reduce any right of assembly. The committee did not 'feel any compelling need to pronounce upon the existence or otherwise of a 'freedom' or 'a human right' to demonstrate on a public highway or anywhere else . . . such 'freedoms' are no more and no less than the right to do anything which is lawful . . . our concern has been the more practical consideration: whether the Public Order Act goes further than necessary or not far enough, in its extension of the legal restrictions upon the use of the public highway, to protect the well-being of the people and to keep peace.' Its principal

recommendations follow from such a starting point.

### **Bans on marches**

The committee recommends no change in the procedure for making bans on marches nor in the grounds for bans. It rejects proposals that the disruption to the normal life of the community or the likelihood of incitement to racial hatred should be added to the present test (the threat of serious public disorder which cannot be contained by other means). It says that mutual aid arrangements between police forces should continue to be a basic element in the assessment of likely public disorder and in doing so supports the results of the government's recent review of arrangements for handling 'spontaneous public disorder'. (see **Bulletin** no 19)

### **Advance notice of marches**

The committee recommends that organisers of marches be legally required to give at least seventy-two hours advance notice of their intentions or as much notice as may 'be reasonably practicable after that time'. It would then be an offence, punishable by a fine of £400, to proceed with a march without notice or contrary to police direction.

### **Police directions and conditions**

The committee recommends that to the present criterion for the imposition of conditions and directions by the police (reasonable apprehension of serious public disorder) there should be added the criterion of reasonable apprehension of serious disruption to the normal life of the community. The power to issue directions is at present vested in chief constables. The committee says it should also be exercisable by the senior officer present at a march. In addition, the attention of the police should be drawn to the 'full range of powers' contained in the Public Order Act and 'they should be encouraged to use them to control the use of flags, banners and emblems likely to occasion a breach of the peace'. Furthermore, the committee states that the

police should be given the power to arrest anyone who contravenes a banning order or who is believed to have ignored directions.

### **Meetings, demonstrations and static assemblies.**

The committee recommends that organisers of static demonstrations on the highway be required to give seventy-two hours notice of their intentions and that the police be given power to issue directions or impose conditions judged 'necessary to prevent serious public disorder or serious disruption to the normal life of the community'.

### **Incitement to racial hatred**

There should be no change in the law on incitement save that it should apply to broadcasting in the same way that it applies to written material or to anything said at a public meeting.

The committee was divided along party lines and three Labour members put their names to a minority report. This recommends the abolition of the power to ban marches on the grounds that 'bans are wrong in principle and unnecessary in practice'; a seven day period of advance notice; and that the provisions of the law on marches continue not to apply to static demonstrations and assemblies.

Scotland was not covered by the Home Affairs Committee enquiry, but the Scottish Office has published a 'Draft Code of Civic Government', intended to replace a number of local acts in 1982. The code includes a requirement of notice of all marches and processions which would include details of time, date, duration, route, numbers expected and stewarding arrangements. No time limit is specified but less than seven days notice would permit a local authority to prohibit a march on the grounds that it had had insufficient time for consideration. Local authorities would have power to impose conditions on a march or prohibit it altogether, although *no criteria for such a prohibition or the imposition of conditions are specified in the code*. Appeal against any action taken by the local authority would lie to the sheriff who could uphold an appeal on the grounds of error in law, a decision based

on incorrect fact or the unreasonable exercise of discretion. Under the code it would be an offence for an organiser not to give notice or to ignore conditions. It would also be an offence for anyone to participate in a march for which notice had not been given or which contravened any conditions imposed or which deviated from the details specified in the original notice.

The recommendations of the Home Affairs Committee would apply not simply to marches but to 'static assemblies', that is to such situations as the black community's response to the National Front meeting at Southall in April 1979 (although not the Front meeting itself) or the mass picket at Grunwick's. Indeed, the Committee's recommendation in this respect is a direct response to Sir David MacNee's demand for more powers to deal with exactly this kind of occasion. The committee states 'If such an industrial dispute should arise again, it is in the public interest that the organisers of any supporting demonstration should be required to give advance notice of their intentions to the police, and to accept reasonable conditions regarding the location of their demonstration. We cannot believe that this will result in any weakening of the trade union movement . . . '.

The committee states its belief that the Public Order Act ought not to have any bearing on industrial picketing. But it is clear that its recommendations would affect picketing as much as any other form of assembly. A picket, restricted under the Employment Act to a person's own place of work, and restricted under the Code of Practice to a maximum of six people, could become a 'static assembly', by occurring at another place or when more than the maximum number of pickets as defined by the police is present. In other words, when would a picket cease to be a picket and become in the eyes of the police and the law, an assembly and therefore subject to the various controls recommended by the Home Affairs Committee.

The importance of these proposals cannot therefore be exaggerated. They lend support to the views put forward by the Home Office in its recent Green Paper on

the Public Order Act. If followed they would amount to the most severe restrictions placed on rights of assembly this century and would strike at the very heart of civil liberties and democratic protest.

**The Law Relating to Public Order**, HC756, £3.90

**Proposals for a Code of Civic Government in Scotland**, Cmnd 7958, £3.25

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## **SPECIAL BRANCH ENFORCES IMMIGRATION LAWS**

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Special Branches in the 52 police forces in the UK have since the turn of the century monitored the presence of aliens in this country. They have also, since 1962, been responsible for executing deportation orders for illegal immigrants and for carrying out local investigations to trace and arrest illegal immigrants. Here we look at the role of the Special Branch in enforcing increasingly restrictive immigration laws over the past 80 years.

### **Special Branch and aliens**

The Special Branch was formed in 1883 to combat Fenian bombings in London, but when the bombings ceased the Special Branch was retained at Scotland Yard not only with a continuing brief on Irish affairs but increasingly to watch the political activities of foreign immigrant groups. Many of the active immigrant groups at this time were political refugees from repressive European states, especially Russia, France and Germany. The Special Branch's reports based on surveillance of immigrant groups gave weight to the lobby to restrict immigration to the UK. Although a Royal Commission reported in 1903 that the number of immigrants in Britain had doubled between 1881 and 1901 no restrictive action was taken until a Home Office committee report came out in 1905. This report was based largely on police and

Special Branch information (at this time Branch work outside London was carried out by the local CID). It said that immigrants had bad 'habits', were settling in already crowded working class areas of London, and were likely to stir up trouble. The Aliens Act 1905 was the first Act to limit immigration. It gave the Home Secretary powers to refuse entry or to deport (on the advice of the police, Special Branch or magistrates) those considered to be 'undesirable aliens'. There also existed a common law power vested in the Crown's royal prerogative powers to refuse admission to aliens (*Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy*, 1891).

The 1905 Act was swiftly reinforced at the outbreak of the First World War by enactment of the Aliens Restriction Act 1914, which gave the government wide discretionary powers. This Act and the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919 were introduced as 'temporary' measures, but both Acts were renewed annually until the Immigration Act 1971. The 1919 Act tightened immigration from the continent to combat the influx of socialist and revolutionary influences stimulated by the Russian Revolution in October 1917.

The 1971 Immigration Act repealed the 1905 and 1914 Acts completely, but parts of the 1919 Act were retained. The latter Act dealt mainly with restrictions on the employment of aliens and on their civil rights and these restrictions have been retained. It remains a criminal offence for an alien to promote or attempt to promote industrial unrest at their place of work unless they have been there for more than two years. Likewise, the 'royal prerogative' powers, exercised by the Home Secretary on behalf of the Crown, also remain. There was no right of appeal against deportation until 1969 (except for the period between 1905 and 1914). Today there is a right of appeal, under the 1971 Immigration Act, except when convicted by a criminal court that recommends deportation, then the right of appeal is lost and the Home Secretary's discretion to order deportation is complete (see Louis Blom-Cooper on the Iranian deportations, *Guardian* 15.9.80).

Under the present immigration laws the category of alien (or 'foreign national') includes all those who are not British or Commonwealth citizens, but does include EEC Nationals and those from Pakistan (since the Pakistan Act 1973).

The powers of the Special Branch in regard to aliens are still extensive. All aliens on entry to this country are granted limited leave to stay here, as visitors, students or workers, and are required to register within 7 days with the local police under the Immigration (Registration with the Police) Regs 1972, S.1758. They are also required to complete a detailed questionnaire including place of residence, work, relatives etc. Any changes in the particulars provided must also be reported to the local police. Every Chief Constable must keep a register of aliens in his area and this work is undertaken by the Special Branches. Most Chief Constables' annual reports give details of the total number of aliens registered in their areas usually broken down by country of origin and 'ethnic group' - European, Africans, Americans, Asians and Others being the standard categories. The number of aliens 'detected' (i.e. having overstayed or broken some provisions) in 1979 was 581, compared to 266 in 1977 (see table for details).

All applications for extensions of leave to stay in this country are vetted by the Special Branch who give magistrates reports on deportation if applicants have been convicted of *any* offence. The Special Branch also vet all applications for naturalisation (the right to reside permanently here) on behalf of the Home Office. Registration of aliens also gives the Special Branch a pretext for keeping under surveillance political activists concerned with events in their home countries. For this reason it has long been necessary for applicants for entry to the Special Branch to be proficient in at least one foreign language.

### **Special Branch and illegal immigrants**

Since the 1962 Immigration Act (which restricted the right of entry of

Commonwealth citizens for the first time) the Special Branch have also been responsible for tracing illegal immigrants and executing deportation orders emanating from the Home Office or the Immigration Service (for the background to subsequent Immigration Acts see **Race, Class and the State**, Institute of Race Relations, 1976).

A total of 382 illegal Commonwealth immigrants were arrested during 1979, of whom 255 were immediately deported (see table). An examination of the annual reports of Chief Constables under the headings of 'Special Branch' (which only started to appear in 1978) or 'Nationality & Aliens Department' (a euphemism for Special Branch work) shows that the Special Branch is responsible for nearly all of these arrests. Most of the 1978 and 1979 reports on the Special Branches refer to their duties in relation to immigration, e.g. 'matters pertaining to Commonwealth citizens' (Thames Valley) or 'control of commonwealth immigration inquiries' (Norfolk).

Although only a few reports contain full details – the inclusion of information being entirely at the 'discretion' of the Chief Constable — the following are contained in reports for 1979: *Cleveland*: 2 illegal immigrants 'arrested and dealt with' (3 in 1978, and 27 in 1976); *Greater Manchester*: 92 people arrested and 'proceeded against' under the Immigration Acts; *Lancashire*: 13 deportations executed and 38 illegal immigrants 'traced'; *Strathclyde*: 4 deportations executed and 15 illegal immigrants 'traced' (these were ordered to be 'removed from the UK'); *Avon and Somerset*: 22 deportation orders executed and 7 illegal immigrants 'traced'; *Leicestershire*: (1978) 6 'commonwealth subjects' deported. The details given in these 7 reports, which exclude many of the major urban centres, indicates that, taken overall, the 'tracing' of illegal immigrants at a local level is carried out by the Special Branches and that they also 'execute' deportation orders emanating from their own activities or other agencies, like the Immigration Service.

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Commonwealth citizens and foreign nationals detected during 1979, under Schedule 2 of the 1971 Immigration Act:

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#### **Commonwealth citizens**

**Total:** 382(424 in 1978, 512 in 1977)

Deported/removed:255

Allowed to stay indefinitely:65

Allowed to stay for a limited period:30

Arrived before 1st Jan, 1973:1

Other categories, seamen deserters, overstayers:28

Illegal status not established:3

#### **Foreign Nationals(alien)**

**Total:** 581(459 in 1978, 266 in 1977)

Deported/removed:330

Allowed to stay indefinitely:156

Allowed to stay for a limited period:18

Other:seamen deserters, deportations, overstayers:60

Illegal status not established:17

Source: **Control of Immigration Statistics 1979**, Home Office 1980, Cmnd 7875

Only one 1970 report, Lancashire, is explicit about the kind of local operations being carried out by Special Branches. It says that there is a continuing inquiry being conducted in the Blackburn area where 13 people have already been charged under the Immigration Act. 'Available evidence', the report says, 'suggests illegal entry of approximately 50 women from the Indian subcontinent within a scenario of much larger proportions.' A further series of raids was made by the Special Branch on January 22 this year when 10 Indian women were detained, taken to the offices of the Immigration Service at Manchester Airport and flown home (**Blackburn Times**, 15.8.80). The officer who was in charge of the raid told the local paper that it was 'the team's biggest coup since Asian immigrants began settling in Blackburn in the 1960s'.

The Special Branch is also responsible for keeping a close watch on the political and industrial activity of black communities. Mr. James Anderton, the Chief Constable for Greater Manchester, makes explicit the connection between tracing illegal immigrants and intelligence-gathering in his 1979 report on the local Special Branch:

'The work of the Branch includes . . . assistance in the execution of deportation orders issued by the Home Secretary and because of specialised knowledge in the field, investigation is carried out into matters relating to illegal immigration.

The understanding and experience of differing ethnic groups gained by the Branch is often useful to operational detectives investigating serious crimes occurring within those communities.'

Their work combines intelligence gathered through their questioning of immigrants as to their status, which is supplemented by information passed to them by local uniformed police on the beat or participating in 'community policing' schemes.

At the national level the Special Branches work closely with the Illegal Immigrant Intelligence Unit and the Immigration

Service, as well as the Home Office (see Bulletin no. 10). It was recently admitted that the Home Office maintains a register of offences committed by Commonwealth immigrants (and aliens). The Home Office has confirmed that this practice has been going on since 1945 although it is only meant to apply to those who have been granted leave to stay in this country for a limited period (**Sunday Times**, 17.8.80). In August Mr Khaira, 30, born in Singapore but resident in this country for nearly 20 years, pleaded guilty to a speeding offence and was fined £25. Officers from the local Hampshire police visited him after the case and presented a form entitled: 'Report for the Information of the Under Secretary of State, Home Office, on the conviction of an alien Commonwealth citizen'. The form included sections headed: 'Recommended for deportation' and 'Special Branch informed' (**Guardian** 16.8.80). How wide this net is cast nationally is not known. Nor is it known whether it extends to Commonwealth immigrants who have the right to live here under the Immigration Acts. One police annual report however, (Lothian and Borders, covering Edinburgh and Borders) reports that 'Three Commonwealth citizens were arrested or reported for crimes'. Is this the tip of the iceberg?

The fall in 'detected' illegal immigrants in the table over the past three years from 512 in 1977 to 383 last year is explained in the Chief Inspector of Constabulary's Report for 1978 (this covers all forces in England and Wales). It stated that: 'The practice of illegal immigrants gaining entry by clandestine landing is minimal . . . (and) the main methods of illegal entry are now deception at ports of entry'. The Special Branch are therefore engaged in clearing-up the backlog of those who entered illegally over the past ten years.

### **Overstayers and recording entry**

'Overstayers' are people who come to this country for a limited period and then stay beyond the time limit stamped on their passport. They are mainly people who

originally come as visitors, but include students and other categories of temporary entrants. Until July 30 this year the job of tracking down overstayers was mainly carried out by the Immigration Service, with limited assistance from the uniformed police. However, after two judgements, in the cases of Subrananian and Suthendran relating to S.24(1)(b) of the 1971 Act, a registered letter from the Home Secretary refusing the immigrant's leave to remain was no longer considered adequate. A Home Office circular laid down that in future a police officer should contact and read out the notice to the person concerned as a means of efficiently enforcing the law (see **Bulletin** no 15).

On August 1 a new immigration control computer became fully operational. It records all arrivals in this country and the conditions of stay; it is expected to handle 1-2 million arrivals every year. This is compared to only 20,000 enquiries initiated in 1979 by means of the manual matching of landing and embarkation cards — and even this system led to over 1,000 deportations.

The long-standing registration and monitoring of aliens by the Special Branch is now being more strictly enforced. In addition, since the 1960s, the Special Branch's role has been extended to deal with illegal Commonwealth immigrants. On top of these, the problem of overstayers is now to be systematically dealt with by the new computer. Taken together, these measures can be seen as preparing the ground for the Tory government's new Nationality Law which the Special Branch, the police and the courts are fully prepared to enforce on the ground.

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## NATO EXERCISES

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Europe has just seen its biggest display of militarism for at least 30 years, as Western military chiefs pretended that a global war threatened. 25 Nato exercises collectively known as Autumn Forge were held

throughout September right across the European mainland, in the seas around and the skies above, as the Nato countries mobilised to resist an attack from Eastern Europe.

British armed forces were heavily involved in several of these wargames. The Navy committed 47 of its vessels to Exercise Team Work 80, a series of manoeuvres from September 10-24 across the North Atlantic, North Sea, English Channel and Norwegian Sea, involving 60,000 Nato personnel, a total of 170 ships and 400 aircraft. The air forces of six Nato countries took part in Exercise Cold Fire 80 from September 15-26. Centred on West Germany, this involved most of the West Germany-based units of the RAF plus two units from Britain — that is, most of the RAF.

The biggest of the 25 manoeuvres was Exercise Crusader 80, a test of the British Army's capability to mobilise and reinforce the British Army on the Rhine while at the same time defending the 'Home Base' (the UK government and key installations) against internal and external attacks. Crusader ran for five weeks, from August 31 until October 4, and involved shipping 10,000 regular soldiers, 20,000 members of the Territorial Army (a third of its strength) and 12,500 vehicles and trailers across to West Germany for a huge 'battle' between 63,000 troops. The mobilisation and transshipment phase of Crusader was called Exercise Jog Trot and ferried 15,000 troops and most of the vehicles across the Channel in 111 special sailings of civilian and service ships. A mixture of civil and military aircraft flew 191 sorties from airports all over the UK to take the remainder of the troops abroad.

The other two phases of Crusader were Spearpoint and Square Leg. Spearpoint was the battle in West Germany, while Square Leg activated the military Home Defence system for a wide variety of operations on the British mainland. The 'International Herald Tribune' newspaper (17.6. 1980) described Square Leg as 'the least spectacular but perhaps the most important part of Crusader 80' as it was 'critical' that Britain should be preserved as a secure

staging post for American troops reinforcing Europe.

Square Leg had both military and civilian activity. The main military wargames took place in the week ended September 19 on the Army ranges at Otterburn in Northumberland and Stanford in Lincolnshire, where several thousand regular and TA soldiers defended pretend 'key installations' (telephone exchanges, American bases, power stations, food dumps, police stations, etc) against subversives, saboteurs and enemy paratroopers. These manoeuvres basically tested the Eighth Field Force, the 10,000-strong regular and volunteer unit based at Bulford on Salisbury Plain specifically allocated the job of providing military aid to the civil power in an emergency.

The civilian side of Square Leg largely took place between September 20 and 24, when the government's bunker system was brought into use. This aspect of Square Leg was the third in a series of similar military-based exercises that started in 1975 with Exercise Inside Right and was followed in 1978 by Exercise Scrum Half. These 'command post' trials aimed at testing the efficiency of the civil defence bunker system and the way it ties into the military emergency command structure that parallels it.

The scenario for the civilian side of Square Leg was a nuclear attack on Britain on September 19, following the declaration of war a few days previously. Sub-Regional Headquarters and County Controls (Group Controls in London) were activated and staffed to deal with the after-effects of the attacks. (See **Bulletin** no 8, pp.13-23 for a full description and analysis of the civil defense system, and **Peace News** 5.6.80, p.12, for a detailed chart.)

The civil defence system tried out in Square Leg would be activated to handle a general strike or other major civil disturbance. Periodic dummy-runs have a nuclear war scenario partly to dodge the possible political outcry that might accompany an overt internal security operation, and partly because a war scenario anyway contains all the possible

law and order problems that the authorities might have to deal with.

The British taxpayer paid out over ten million pounds for Crusader and the other military manoeuvres.

The Ministry of Defence says that they have been a vital test of the armed forces (particularly the Army) following the large-scale reorganisation of the past five years. In particular, the top brass wanted to test how well integrated the TA is with the regular troops, how the still-unreliable Chieftain tanks would stand up to prolonged journeys (answer: badly) and whether the military's reliance on civilian transport was feasible. These are all plausible and relevant questions. But the enormous scale of the operation and the vast amount of obviously militarily-generated press coverage that came with it raise the issue of just how much it was a public relations exercise by the Ministry of Defence and an arrogant display of bravado by the increasingly powerful military establishment.

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## NEW US NUCLEAR WAR POLICY

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Jimmy Carter's 'presidential directive 59' thoughtfully made available for the 35th anniversary celebration of the destruction of Hiroshima on August 8, announces the 'new' US nuclear missile doctrine called variously 'counterforce' or 'first-strike' targetting. It is not clear that it in fact makes much change in actual targetting of US missiles. It probably has more to do with the 1980 elections than anything else. As such, it is a disquieting indication of the power of the lunatic Right in US politics. Carter has adapted to this political strength, most of it tied to Republican candidate Ronald Reagan, by a series of 'tough' statements and decisions aimed at reducing his exposure to Right/Republican attacks on the Carter administration's alleged 'softness' towards 'the Soviet threat'. The



go-ahead for the M-X missile system, the departure of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (who has joined the new Palme Commission on disarmament and development) and the huge (5½%) real increase in military spending all support Carter's general re-assertion of American strength in the face of Reagan's claims such as that the war in Vietnam could have been won with greater determination. Carter has simply bowed before the wind from hardline exponents of the world-wide re-assertion of American strength, much as President Truman did in the late 1940s, without attempting to make much of a political fight of it.

The 'new' nuclear doctrine has been around for some time, having been thoroughly aired in the period 1961-63 when present 'mutual assured destruction' doctrine was established, and again by Defence Secretary James Schlesinger in 1974. The present political sponsors of counterforce doctrine are the extreme Right and the Cold War 'liberal' groups like the Committee on the Present Danger (see **Bulletin** no 16). They claim that the Russians could launch a surprise nuclear attack and destroy the Minuteman ballistic missiles before they left their silos in the US. (Minuteman missiles are however but one of the triad of nuclear delivery systems, each of which under existing doctrine is capable of surviving a first strike and inflicting massive damage with a counter-attack, so this alleged vulnerability, even if true, would not invalidate existing doctrine.) These groups stress the build-up of Soviet strength, attacking 'detente' and its SALT-2 centrepiece as selling out to the Reds (on SALT-2, see **Bulletin** no 14). Other exponents of counterforce are of course the major contractors and sections of the armed forces.

Strategic theory of nuclear war is a peculiarly American product, which the US exports through the military alliances which constitute its military predominance throughout the non-Communist world. The US provides nearly all the nukes targetted against the Soviet Union, the only other power having any strategic nukes formally under Nato direction being Britain, whose

targetting is integrated into Nato's and thus into US targetting. Not surprisingly, then, the Thatcher government decided in July to go ahead with the supreme counterforce weapon, the huge Trident submarines.

Since the immediate aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, US nuclear strategic targetting has been based upon the simple theory of 'mutual assured destruction' or MAD. Compared to counterforce doctrine, MAD is sane and peaceful. At least in theory it ensures that no rational government embarks upon a nuclear war, that, in fact, a Dr Strangelove maniac is necessary for nuclear war to happen. Counterforce, however, makes actual nuclear war-fighting 'rational' (on the level of strategic theory) for governments. It undermines the stable deterrence provided by MAD. Both limited nuclear war and the longer prospect of a disabling first strike, by which one superpower knocks out by surprise *all* of the missiles of the other, become at least theoretically possible. More importantly the more expenditure and technological virtuosity is poured into the counterforce 'game' the less sure both sides will be that it is 'irrational' for the other to launch a first-strike.

MAD made actual war 'irrational' as an instrument of state policy by the simple expedient of making sure that if either side launched a nuclear attack it would itself be largely destroyed — i.e. mutual assured destruction. A secure regime of mutual assured destruction required that each side have sufficient nuclear delivery systems so placed that enough could survive any conceivable nuclear attack and retaliate with a second-strike inflicting such damage on the attacker that no attack would be worthwhile. MAD does not require technologies beyond those existing in the early 1960s.

MAD allowed rational calculation of how much military nuclear hardware was enough. The McNamara Pentagon decided that a triad of three separate nuclear delivery systems each independently capable of surviving any likely surprise attack in sufficient numbers to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage was enough.

The triad — submarines (Polaris), bombers (B-52s etc), and land-based ICBMs (Minuteman) met the conditions for MAD in three independent ways. It promised stable deterrence, and combined with the opening of SALT talks in the late sixties both made nuclear war improbably, and promised reduction of nuclear military budgets.

The Pentagon estimates that the 128 largest population centres in the USSR contain around 28% of Soviet population and produce around 56% of Soviet industrial production, and the destruction of these centres would constitute 'unacceptable damage' sufficient to deter a Soviet first-strike. One Trident alone will supposedly have the capacity to destroy these centres, and the existing British Polaris submarines can do the trick.

To destroy the 128 largest Soviet population centres, no huge missile accuracy is required, and nor were such 'advances' as multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). However, counterforce or first-strike doctrine envisages attacking hardened missile silos, airforces, submarines, satellites and control centres of the other side in order to prevent the launching of missiles. All that advances in accuracy and in ability to destroy the other side's nuclear forces do is increase insecurity by subverting the 'rational' foundation of MAD. While neither the Soviet Union nor the US has the technology now to wipe out, or to try to wipe out, *all* the other side's nuclear weapons (nor is it clear that this particular spectre would ever be feasible in reality), the US is well ahead in development of most relevant technologies towards this end. The completely disabling nuclear first-strike whereby one side would 'win' the irradiated remains of the other by eliminating all of its nukes in one surprise attack has political power. It is a spectre for which 'rational' men claim they have to prepare by developing the counterforce arms race.

The abiding problem with nuclear weapons as instruments of state power and policy is the problem of making them usable without being counterproductive (as they

are under MAD), or alternatively of converting the threat of their use into political gains. Counterforce war-fighting theories do not resolve this problem. They do not make war more rational in any substantial sense, but merely erode the 'rational' basis of MAD. Why, then, has counterforce raised its head again at this point? The main problem is the core problem of military security in the 'postwar' world — that so long as immense resources go into military research and development, that is, into the 'creative obsolescence' of weapons systems, successive generations of more destructive armaments each of which makes the global situation *less* secure, will be produced. The age of the original triad of nuclear systems, and the huge R & D budgets over two decades of development of new guidance, miniaturisation and nuclear technologies have created the demand for replacement of the 1960s triad which then assured, and still assure, mutual assured destruction. The cruise missile and Pershing-2 missiles decided at the December 1979 Nato summit are counterforce weapons; so is the M-X missile system which Carter has decided to proceed with, and so is the Trident submarine system which Britain is to buy from the US to replace Polaris.

The spectre of limited nuclear war in Europe used by British exponents of the Trident decision envisages, for example, a Soviet 'limited' strike which takes out, say, Birmingham, in return for which the US eliminates, say, Prague. At this stage the two principals supposedly pause to discuss things and decide whether to carry on escalating. Lucky divided Europe. The US and Soviet homes of the respective nuclear umbrellas over West and East Europe would temporarily remain relatively unscathed while fall-out took its toll over Europe. The problem with the scenario is that Soviet doctrine, such as it is, does not seem to envisage any such 'limited' strikes. One reason: while the Atlantic allows the US to consider a European war as remote, such a war is on the Soviet borders and thus is not obviously distinguishable from total nuclear war.

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## MI5 SPY ON UNIONIST

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A document passed to Time Out magazine in London confirms that local inquiries on trade union activities are carried out on behalf of MI5, the large undercover internal agency, by local special branches (25.7.80). The document, a report on a shop steward who worked at the Carnation Foods factory in Dumfries, was prepared by a Detective Hunter of the Dumfries and Galloway Special Branch in response to a request for information from MI5 in London. MI5 identified the shop steward, James Hogg, by his National Insurance number. The report from Detective Hunter was addressed to: 'Director General, Box 500, Parliament Street BO, London SW1P 1XH' — 'Box 500' is a long-standing postal euphemism for MI5.

The report, in part, read:

(2) 'Hogg is at present employed at the Carnation Foods Limited, Dumfries, as a quality control inspector and is an active member of the Transport and General Workers Union at the factory. Hogg is a shop steward and a member of the factory negotiating team on behalf of the union at the factory. (3) Hogg has been described by a *management contact* as being more than usually active in union debates within the factory and is thought of as very left wing. Hogg is thought to be connected with the Socialist Workers Party also, although this cannot be verified at present and is based solely on hearsay information from inside the Carnation Foods factory. (4) Hogg cannot proceed any further within the Carnation Foods factory either in a work capacity or within the union structure at the factory and it is *thought by management* that he may well leave some time in the near future to take up some kind of full time employment with the TGWU. This situation will obviously be *monitored* and any

further development will be reported in due course . . . (6) The text of communication PF886214/FiC/25 (MI5's ref.no.) has been noted in respect of Hogg's involvement with the Communist Party of Great Britain, and this will of course *be watched* for any subsequent developments' (our emphases).

Hogg is not a member of the Socialist Workers Party or of the Communist Party — although he knows members of both parties — but he is an active shop steward and trade unionist. Hogg said of the report: 'I don't see myself as someone very important — just a shop steward, just an ordinary worker doing my job to try and improve the conditions of my fellow workers. It was an infringement of civil liberties that they should compile a record on me when I have not got a criminal record.'

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## CRUISE MISSILE BASES IN UK

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Residents living near the new Cruise missile bases at Molesworth in Cambridgeshire and Greenham Common in Berkshire are being told by the Ministry of Defence that having the missiles in Britain will not make the UK a nuclear target — because it already is one. This reassuring news is in a special propaganda pamphlet produced by the MoD for local distribution around the bases.

The announcement that 96 United States Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) were to be based at Greenham Common and another 64 at Molesworth was made to the House of Commons by the Defence Secretary Francis Pym on June 17 (**Hansard**, cols 1342-1358). Greenham Common is a major USAF stand-by base, nominally under the control of the RAF, as are all USAF bases in Britain.

Molesworth is a currently inactive site close to the big American base at Alconbury, and is used by the USAF for

storage. Greenham Common will come into use first, probably during 1983, with an extra 1,300 American service personnel being drafted in; Molesworth will be activated soon after, with an extra 250 Americans arriving.

It is believed that one of the major factors affecting the choice of the two bases is their proximity to major arterial routes: Molesworth lies beside the north-south axis of the A1, while Greenham is close to the east-west route of the M4. GLCMs are carried around the countryside on the backs of special articulated lorries called Transport Erector Launchers (TELs). Each TEL carries four missiles, with four TELs making up a GLCM Flight. The Flight moves around with its accompanying command and control vehicle, and armed military escort.

Increased public concern over the Cruise deployment led Bob Cryer MP to ask Francis Pym exactly what sites in Britain are occupied by US forces (see our USAF list, Bulletin No 18). Pym's reply (**Hansard**, 7/7/80, cols 54-55) added the following to our list: storage facilities at Molesworth, Ridgewell, Upwood, Framlingham, Feltwell, Watton, Bicester, Burtonwood, Hythe Marchwood and Poole. 'Logistics Support Facilities' at Welford, Caerwent, Bramley and Broughton Moor. Administrative offices in central London, Eastcote, Ruislip and High Wycombe. And communications facilities at Barkway, Daventry, Great Bromley, Martlesham Heath, Mormond Hill, Botley Hill, Boringdon, Coldbrow, Croughton, Dunkirk, Chicksands, Swingate, Uxbridge, Barford St John, Wincombe, Christmas Common, St Mawgan, Menwith Hill, Edzell, Thurso and Fylingdales. (This list includes US Army and Navy sites, as well as USAF; the US Navy base at Holy Loch was omitted. In all, Pym said, there are now 24,500 US service personnel in Britain (two-thirds the number of British Combat troops in the UK). The siting of GLCMs in Britain has already led to local protests, notably at Greenham Common on September 21. A national CND demonstration against nuclear weapons is to take place on October 26.

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## MET FUND NEW POLICE STUDY

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In May 1979 it was announced that the Metropolitan Police were to commission an in-depth study of police-black relations in London. The project, the 'personal concept' of Sir David McNee, the Commissioner, was response to 'persistent criticism against his force from immigrant communities in London' (**Observer** 6.5.79.). A John Brown was chosen to undertake the project. Brown, the head of the social policy unit at the Cranfield Institute of Technology had conducted a similar, much smaller project in Handsworth, Birmingham in 1977, which the West Midlands Deputy Chief Constable said was 'very good' and a 'great help' to the police. Brown was McNee's personal choice for the project, and the 'police believe he is a respected independent figure acceptable to all' (op.cit.).

### 'Shades of Grey'

Brown's 1977 report on Handsworth entitled 'Shades of Grey' may have helped the West Midlands police but it has done little to improve the situation of the local black community. Brown advanced the idea that a reactive strong-arm type of policing would be counter-productive for inner city areas with a disaffected and unemployed youthful black population. Together with an award-winning film of the same name, the study argued that a 'community policing' approach was a viable form of social control in black areas. This was to provide the basis for the now infamous community policing project in the Lozells section of Handsworth. But, more importantly, the report also provided the basis for the now commonplace association between Rastafarians and crime. Talking at great length of Handsworth's criminalised dreadlocks subculture, Brown viewed the problems of blacks in the area not as the effects of racism in all aspects of their lives,

but as the persistent legacy of the slave experience, which, as it was not British in its origins, could hardly be expected to be solved here — especially with youth unemployment so high.

### **Brown's project dropped**

Brown's London project, which was to cost £20,000 or more and take two years to complete, intended to look at three separate but representative black communities. Although the locations were not named, Brown conducted preliminary groundwork in Hackney. And just three months after the announcement of the project it was revealed in 'Police Review' that the project had been shelved because: 'Spokesmen from the immigrant communities were unwilling to cooperate with the Cranfield researchers because they were dissatisfied with previous projects carried out by the institute.' (3.8.79).

Three months later, in November 1979, the **Daily Telegraph** Scotland Yard crime reporter revealed, without making any reference to Brown's project, that 'a two-year study of relationships between the community and the police is planned by the Metropolitan Police' (19.11.79). The project would 'include relationships with ethnic minority groups'. This time McNee had asked the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) to conduct the study. The PSI, the **Daily Telegraph** emphasised, was an 'independent organisation' — like the Cranfield Institute.

What McNee clearly hopes will come out of the study is spelt out in his latest annual report (June 1980 Cmnd 7932). The study, he writes, will look at police relations, 'with all sections of the public, including the various ethnic minorities' and 'is likely to involve several thousand police officers and private citizens.' The object is to find out what the general situation is and if relations with certain groups are not good, why that is and what measures can be taken to improve matters'. The only objective published research', McNee writes, 'was carried out ten years ago by Professor Belson.' 'Objective research', it seems, can only be

that financed by the Metropolitan Police themselves.

Belson's study, proposed to the then Commissioner, Sir Joseph Simpson, in 1966 and completed in 1973 had two conclusions (**The Public and the Police**, Harper & Row, 1975). First, the study found that the adult population in general viewed the police favourably, and this was used by the police for public relations purposes. Second, that certain minorities, in this study young people, were less well disposed to the police.

The new study by the Policy Studies Institute follows much the same lines as Belson's except that black people as well as young people are to be singled out for special attention. The project is under the direction of David Smith, who has recently finished a study at the PSI on 'Ethnic minorities and unemployment' for the Department of Employment and 'Technicalities of new survey of ethnic minorities' for the Home Office (see below on census). He is at present a special adviser on race relations to the Home Affairs sub-committee on race relations and immigration on 'racial disadvantage'. According to the PSI's Annual Report for 1978-79, Smith and a colleague were preparing to use the 1981 census, in a Home Office sponsored project, to develop survey techniques which would 'yield a sample representing people of Asian and West Indian origin right across the country.' This survey will now have been scotched because not only will the 1981 census not include the controversial section on racial origin (included in a pilot survey in Haringey, London) but the question on 'parental ethnic origin' which was in the 1971 census has also been dropped.

According to Smith the McNee project has 'superseded' rather than replaced the one originally taken on by Brown. Its title is 'Relations between the Metropolitan Police and the Public', and Smith says that it will put 'particular emphasis on ethnic groups'. The project will cover four areas: 1) the police as an organisation; 2) a survey of police officers at middle and junior ranks — a large sample of 1-2,000; 3) a survey of the

public as a whole, with a very large sample of young and black people; and 4) observations of the police at work. The object of the project is to recommend policy changes to the police.

Smith has not named the areas where black people are to be surveyed but has said that certain areas like Hackney, Southall and Brixton would obviously have to be included.

The scope of this project has clearly been extended from the one originally proposed to Brown which was purely concerned with police-black relations to a wider one which covers police-public relations in general. This shift may reflect growing criticism and what is seen as his inability to restore faith in the London police.

However, there is no reason to suppose that the PSI (an amalgamation of Political and Economic Planning, PEP, and the Centre for Studies in Social Policy, in 1978) is going to be any more 'acceptable' or 'independent' regarding the black community than the Cranfield Institute and John Brown. While the politics of the PSI may be termed 'centrist' (like Cranfield) the 'centre' has shifted swiftly to the right in the past few years and the kind of studies the PSI undertakes fall clearly into the category of advising the state and government on how best to cope with the 'problems' they are facing.

The joint presidents of the PSI are Lord Roll, director of the Bank of England, and Lord Seebohm of Barclays Bank. The Chairman of its Council is Sir Montague Finniston, chairman of the British Steel Corporation before Villiers, and its director, John Pinder, was research director of the Federal Trust which provided the research arm of the European movement which poured millions of pounds into getting Britain to join the EEC.

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## ARMY BUY NEW ANTI-RIOT VEHICLE

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The British Army recently bought its first vehicles designed especially for urban

internal security operations. Three AT 105 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were purchased from GKN Sankey as potential replacements for the ageing Humber 'Pig' APC, hundreds of which are in service in Northern Ireland.

The Pig was largely withdrawn following the arrival of the Saracen, but had to be hurriedly brought back into service in 1969 with the start of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Since then, the Pig and Saracen have become familiar on TV screens across the world as the British Army's troop carriers.

Neither are particularly suited to their tasks, however; the Pig lacks refinements of almost any description, whilst the Saracen is short on versatility and has a relatively poor level of protection.

Politicians have always been extremely reluctant to acquire for the Army a purpose-built urban internal security vehicle, fearing the hostile public reaction that would greet the sight of soldiers being equipped specifically to fight civilians — especially British civilians. Development work on the Pig replacement was therefore kept at arms length by the Ministry of Defence, preferring to let a private company undertake the task.

The AT 105 is a four-wheeled machine, available in six different models, including a basic army APC, and a 'Police Task Force' version (with or without machine gun). One of its strongest selling points in an increasingly competitive market is its high degree of armoured protection, claimed to be proof against all small arms fire up to 7.62 calibre, and with superior defence against mines. Up to 12 soldiers or police in full riot gear can be carried.

GKN Sankey is a major subsidiary of Britain's largest engineering group. Guest Keen and Nettlefolds, employers of over 107,000 people and with an annual turnover of £1,750m. Sankeys believe that the AT 105 is the best internal security vehicle of its type in the world, and the deal with the British Army should assure a large overseas demand for it. But the political sensitivity of the AT 105 will probably delay its debut on the streets of Northern Ireland.

### BACKGROUND PAPER

Some years ago, Bruce Smith, a doyen of American 'police science' argued that there is no police *system* in the US: 'Our so-called police systems are mere collections of police unities having some similarity of authority, organisation or jurisdiction; but they lack any systematic relationship to each other'<sup>1</sup>. Smith estimated that there were some 40,000 separate law enforcement agencies in the US. This figure has been parroted in most texts since then, and is enshrined in the 1967 Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.<sup>2</sup>

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA, established in 1968) attempts to introduce some systematisation of police agencies. One of the major trends in policing in the West over the last decade and a half is greater centralisation, but the US police remain the most decentralised in the industrial world. The LEAA has estimated that there are nearly 20,000 separate police agencies in the US<sup>3</sup>. Of these, 277 are Federal or tribal (Native American) agencies, 55 state police, and 18,255 local forces<sup>4</sup>, a bewildering array of departments with different jurisdictions, sizes, structures, standards and styles. There is little in common between the police departments of Dozier, Alabama (one man), Sleepy Hollow, Illinois (three men, one woman) or Sweeny, Texas (five men) and their nominal counterparts in New York City (30,000 officers), apart from the colour of their uniforms — and sometimes not even that. Most departments are tiny, 80% of the agencies employing less than ten police officers. Most police are however in the big city departments. Consequently,

generalisation about the American police is hazardous and this paper will only identify major characteristics and trends. To summarise, the most striking features of American police (and the key problems facing administrators) are extreme decentralisation, endemic lawlessness, and ineffectiveness. These problems produce perennial complaints about American police. The main internal strategies for resolving these problems are and have been centralisation, 'professionalisation' (i.e. upgrading personnel and the 'technological fix'), and public relations. There have also been successive attempts to strengthen external civilian control which have made little headway against the resistance, organised and unorganised, of rank-and-file police.

#### American Police Organisation

The main responsibility for policing everyday life in the US lies at local level, organised by the municipality, township or county. The involvement of both State and Federal government in law enforcement has expanded during this century, and this trend accelerated rapidly in the last decade. The data on employment and expenditure (Table 1) demonstrate several crucial points: (i) The rapid and substantial growth in the 1970s of employment and expenditure by police agencies at all levels of government. While in 1971 there were 23 police employed per 10,000 of the population in the US, by 1977 there were 27. Expenditure per capita on criminal justice activities rose from \$45 to \$87. The largest rates of increase were in the South and West, but all states experienced rises in police employment and expenditure. The increases were greater than in other sectors of government work: police expenditure rose 92.5% 1971-7 (and total criminal justice expenditure by 105%) while general government expenditure rose by 79%. Police employment rose 19.2% (criminal

justice employment by 31.3%) and total government employment by only 12.5%.

(ii) Policing is predominantly a local activity. In 1977, 69.9% of expenditure and 74.4% of employment was in local police agencies (mainly municipalities). Federal police agencies spent 14.9% and employed 11.1% of the totals, while State police accounted for 15.2% and 14.5% respectively. (iii) Increasing centralisation is by far a more rapid increase in Federal and State than in local police employment and expenditure. Federal government increased its share of total police expenditure by 1.9%, and State government by 1% 1971-7, while the share of local expenditure fell by 2.9%. For police employment the federal share increased by 0.4%, State police by 1.4%, while local police declined by 1.8%.

### FBI and Federal Police

Over 100 different agencies of the Federal Government have some law-enforcement responsibilities with jurisdiction over violations of federal statutes. The most important are in the Department of Justice and the Treasury. The best-known Federal law-enforcement agency is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the Department of Justice. Formed in 1924 out of the Bureau of Investigation (which dates back to 1908), the FBI by the mid-1930s had acquired the status of the nation's prime crime fighting force, due to the aggressive public relations efforts of Director J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover used such *causes célèbres* as the Lindbergh kidnapping of 1934 and mid-

Western bank-robbers such as Dillinger, Bonny and Clyde, 'Machine-Gun' Kelly and 'Pretty Boy' Floyd to expand the jurisdiction and powers of his agency. While the FBI's prestige and influence rested on its crime busting operations, Hoover's main obsession (from his involvement as a young Department of Justice lawyer in the notorious 1919-20 Palmer Raids until his death in 1972) remained the Red Peril (see his lurid 1950 cold-war exposé, **Masters of Deceit**). Since Hoover's death, the FBI's reputation has been much tarnished by revelations about its domestic political activities. The direct work of the FBI's 8,700 agents is organised in 57 field offices.

More important than the FBI's direct police work is its role as a co-ordinator of local police efforts. In 1930 the FBI scored a notable coup when it was given responsibility for collating the **Uniform Crime Reports**, the annual index of the nation's crime, from data submitted by all police agencies. The FBI thus got control of the main measuring rod of police success. The FBI acts as a national clearing house for police information. In 1967 it established the National Crime Information Centre, an index of wanted persons, stolen cars and property, which by 1974 was linked to 94 law enforcement agencies, in addition to the FBI's own field offices. Many of these links are state or regional terminals which are themselves entire local information systems. The FBI system contained in 1974 400,000 computerised criminal histories, 4.9 million total entries, and handled about

Table 1: Expenditure (\$ million) & Employment (000s) of US police 1971 & 1977

	Expenditure			Employment		
	1971	1977	Increase(%)	1971	1977	Increase(%)
Federal government	805	1,772	120	57	72	27
State governments	932	1,964	111	73	101	39
Local governments	4,489	8,304	85	446	512	15
All police	6,165	11,865	93	567	686	19

Source: Justice Dept, LEAA, Census Bureau, *Trends in Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System*, US Govt Printing Office, 1978, tables 2-5, 8-11.



130,000 transactions daily. The FBI maintains the nation's largest fingerprint collection, with about 16 million different sets of prints of criminals plus about 62 million of civil service applicants and members of the armed forces. Each day 30,000 sets (10,000 from arrests) of prints are received and processed by over 1,000 FBI personnel.

Other Federal law-enforcement agencies include the Justice Department's Drug Enforcement Agency and Border Patrol. The Treasury Department includes the Secret Service (responsible for protecting the President, and investigating counterfeiting or forgery of Federal documents) and the Customs Bureau. The Internal Revenue Service has a considerable law-enforcement role primarily through its Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms division. In 1978 a study initiated by President Carter pin-pointed the chaotic state of Federal law-enforcement, with its 'meteoric' growth in the 1970s. 'More than 100 federal agencies spend \$5 billion a year on law enforcement responsibilities, but no-one has authority to co-ordinate their activities . . . Over one-third of the 113 agencies surveyed did not exist at the beginning of 1970'<sup>5</sup>. The report recommended some reorganisation and rationalisation, in particular between the Justice Department and Treasury.

### **Law Enforcement Assistance Administration**

Federal efforts to co-ordinate and improve local policing have grown rapidly. The main agency for this has been the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a branch of the Justice Department. LEAA was established in 1968 after the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act which declared a 'war on crime.' LEAA was intended to supply Federal money, expertise and direction for rationalising and upgrading the chaotic police and criminal justice system. It has grown very fast, its budget increasing from \$63 million in 1969 to \$1,015 million in 1976. The LEAA has disbursed \$3 billion to finance police activities and research, supplying money to

police departments for new guns, cars, riot control equipment, helicopters, computers, intelligence gathering systems and many other gadgets. For example, it provided the Los Angeles Police Academy with audio-visual equipment that simulates real-life shooting situations and monitors the trainee's accuracy and the legitimacy of his decisions. (This programme was developed with the Rockwell Information Systems Company.) LEAA presides over a new 'police-industrial complex', that takes technical developments created for overseas warfare or for the space programme, and with government funds, applies them to problems of domestic 'order'<sup>6</sup>. LEAA also fosters co-ordination of effort by separate police agencies. In 1973 it funded the National Sheriffs' Association to develop an operational plan for mutual aid among police forces together with recommendations for legalising it. LEAA has been instrumental in encouraging more state and local law enforcement agencies to join the FBI's National Crime Information System, and has provided \$90 million for the computerisation of local files<sup>7</sup>.

LEAA has been attacked by liberals for its emphasis on police hardware, and by conservatives for financial irregularities and its impotence in stemming the rise in crime. Consequently it has tightened up its budgetary procedures, and given more money to such activities as community groups, rape crisis centres, and academic research. Its research arm, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) recently funded a \$361,000 study of the use of deadly force by police officers by Peter Scharf and Arnold Binder. Research on police shootings is now a minor growth industry, with recent studies by Gerald Caplan, a former director of NILECJ, by Marshall Meyer, a University of California, Riverside sociologist working for the Los Angeles Police Commission, and by NAACP, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People. LEAA, by 'supplying the authority, the methods and the money needed to rationalise the system of internal security in the US . . . represents the first serious

attempt to develop a national apparatus of repression and control'<sup>8</sup>.

### State Police

Most state police forces date back to the beginning of this century, although the most famous, the Texas Rangers, was established in 1835. The 1967 Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement explained their formation by reference to 'the inability or unwillingness of city police forces to pursue lawbreakers beyond their jurisdictional limits convinced state legislatures of the need for statewide police forces.' But many of the state police forces, such as the 1905 Pennsylvania State Police, were established to overcome the problem of local police sympathising with strikers during the bitter labour struggles of the time<sup>9</sup>. Nowadays, most state police forces concentrate on enforcing traffic laws. Some have more general criminal jurisdiction throughout their states, especially in unincorporated rural areas. The impetus for their development came from reformers of the Progressive era (discussed below), with their thrust towards centralisation, professionalisation and technology, rationalised as the search for efficiency and honesty<sup>10</sup>. The state level has become much more important as the funnel for money disbursed by LEAA. Each state has established a planning agency which develops an annual comprehensive criminal justice plan to detail how it will spend its LEAA funds.

### Local Police

Ordinary policing is primarily organised and controlled at local level, but there is increasing pressure for co-ordination from the federal government and professional organisation of police. In most areas there is a complex overlapping of police agencies with diverse jurisdictions with frequent *de facto* co-operation. Thus, in New York City, in addition to the city-wide police department, there are specialised transit and housing police, as well as five counties each with a sheriff's department, and the State police patrolling highways.

Big-city police departments have similar

structures whose core is the motorised uniformed patrols of operations bureaus. These are divided into geographic areas operating from local stations or precincts and they account for the bulk of manpower and expenditure in all forces. Detective investigation bureaus are the next largest sections. Compared to English forces there is a wider range of specialised detectives in for example, specialised robbery or homicide squads.

American city police departments date back to the mid-19th century, when pressure built up from reformers to establish full-time, bureaucratically organised forces on the model of the London police, in place of the patchwork system of constables, sheriffs and night watchmen. The first unified day and night police in the US was established in 1844 in New York City. (Boston instituted separate day and night forces in 1838, and Philadelphia had set up a small day force in 1833, which lasted only two years.) By the 1870s, all the largest American cities had full-time police departments.

Standard histories of the American police (like those of the British police) attribute their establishment to the exigencies of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, seeing them as an inevitable development, opposed only by irrational obscurantists or vested interests<sup>11</sup>. This view overlooks their class control functions, and substantial working-class resistance to the police, particularly with the growth of industrial and political militancy in the last quarter of the 19th century<sup>12</sup>. US city police had been established at a time when the enfranchisement of the (white) working class and the absence of serious political crises allowed police to be entrusted with personal authority without British-style disciplinary controls from above. In London such controls were made essential by bitter resistance to the police while they were being set up in the intense class and political conflicts of the 1830s. Wilbur Miller argued in his seminal comparative study of the foundation of the New York and London police, that this difference underlay the continuing tradition of greater illegality in American police conduct<sup>13</sup>.

## **Police Violence**

American police have been a watchword for lawlessness, with perennial controversy and public enquiry into their abuses of power and systematic corruption.

A cycle of scandal and reform characterises the most obvious aspect of American police lawlessness, their violence and abuse of authority. Miller's comparative history of the London and New York police traces the American cop's reliance on coercive force back to the origins of policing in the US. While the London Metropolitan Police Commissioners strove to ensure the acceptability of the new police in the face of intense class conflict, by developing a tightly disciplined organisation symbolising impersonal legal authority, control of the New York City Police was entrusted to the electoral process and became the creature of partisan politics. The authority of the cop rested not on his representing an abstract legal order, but on his personal command of each encounter. (This was particularly true of the frontier lawmen in the South and West.) As mass immigration in the later 19th century increased social tensions in the cities, the WASPS and successive groups of established ethnics were prepared to condone violent suppression of disorder among the 'dangerous classes' — the latest newcomers. The consequence was a tradition of police violence. 'While London was moving away from violent repression, New York was setting a pattern of violence — the bayonet and the cartridge would become familiar instruments of American riot control' (Miller).

## **Racist Killings**

The US still has the worst record of police violence of any democratic society. Every year in the 1950s and 1960s, more than 200 citizens were killed by the police. In the 1970s the annual number was well over 300. Reflecting the racism apparent in all indices of police encounters with citizens, the death rate for blacks was nine times higher than for whites. 51% of the people killed by police 1960-68 were black, while blacks constitute only about 10% of the population<sup>14</sup>. A recent study of the Los

Angeles Police Department (conducted for the Police Commission) found that 55% of all persons shot by LA police 1974-8 (and 50% of all those killed) were black, compared to 18% blacks in the population and 36% among all persons arrested. While the proportion of people shot who are black has declined recently, the proportion of those who are killed has increased. This racism is further underlined by the following findings: (i) The percentage of police shootings in predominantly black areas was disproportionately high compared with the incidence of violent crime there. (ii) A greater proportion of blacks than whites were fired on for failure to obey an officer, or for making furtive gestures. (iii) A greater proportion of blacks than whites who were shot turned out to be unarmed (28%). (iv) The percentage of officers disciplined for 'out of policy' shootings of blacks was slightly lower than that of officers disciplined for 'out of policy' shootings of whites. (v) The proportion of Latinos among those shot by police rose from 22% in 1978 to 33% in 1979 (the number of attacks on police by Latinos also increased). The study found that the Los Angeles police studied were not particularly trigger-happy by the standards of other cities (they fired their guns and killed less often per capita than most), although they top all other cities in the number of deaths per shooting. The report also found that since the issue had become extremely controversial in September 1977 following some notorious shooting incidents, and policy and training had been tightened, police shootings had dropped significantly<sup>15</sup>.

One response to the political controversy surrounding police use of deadly force has been experimentation with non-lethal weaponry. Two examples recently tested in practice by Los Angeles police:

- (1) use of a lightweight net instead of a shoot-out on three occasions in a month to subdue 'aggressive but unarmed suspects'<sup>16</sup>, and
- (2) a three month test of aerosol-powered 'Chemical Shield': 'the CS, in 1% solution, is "carried" by an acetone and solvent mixture which acts as a catalyst. When

squirted on the skin, the solvent dissolves the fatty deposits that protect the skin surface. It then exposes the nerve endings to the air and to the chemical mixture. The result is excruciating pain, involuntary shutting of the eyes, choking sensations, coughing. The subject is effectively rendered helpless for about 15 minutes<sup>17</sup>.

American police are heavily equipped with conventional arms, and in some cities resemble a walking arsenal. It is not uncommon for police on routine patrol to carry a revolver, ammunition, nightstick (longer and tougher than the English truncheon), mace and handcuffs all on a belt, a shotgun strapped to the dashboard of their car, and a privately owned but legal second pistol concealed inside their uniform.

There is, of course, a vicious circle between such preparations and the real danger police officers face. Danger, Jerome Skolnick pointed out in his classic study of the American police, (together with conservatism, social isolation and internal solidarity) is a key theme of the occupational culture of police<sup>18</sup>. The FBI meticulously collates and analyses annually the numbers of police who are killed on duty. Most police deaths arise out of routine patrols. The reverse side of the racism in shootings by police is that out of 1,573 persons identified as killers of police 1969-78 (about 90% of police killings are cleared by investigation), 49% were black<sup>19</sup>. Since the ghetto riots and anti-war demonstrations of the 1960s, many police forces have set up para-military squads. The prototype is the Los Angeles Special Weapons and Tactics Unit (SWAT). Most large city departments and the FBI now have SWAT-type teams, and there are over 1,000 in the country. Originally trained by the Marines, SWAT teams now train at Universal Studios where they can create realistic simulations of riots, bank robberies, ambushes etc. They are equipped with automatic rifles, semi-automatic shotguns, gas masks, tear-gas canisters and launchers, smoke devices, ropes, pry bars, manhole hooks and walkie-talkies, and are accompanied by a mobile

command post. Their massive fire-power was demonstrated in 1975, when they literally roasted members of the Symbionese Liberation Army inside a Los Angeles house, expending 5371 rounds of ammunition and 83 tear-gas canisters into the building which was totally destroyed<sup>20</sup>.

### **Police Corruption**

In 1973, the 'Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption' in New York City summed up the situation thus: 'At the time of the commission's investigation, police corruption was found to be an extensive, department-wide phenomenon, indulged in to some degree by a sizeable majority of those on the force and protected by a code of silence on the part of those who remained honest. The Commission's findings were hardly new. As long ago as 1844, when the state legislature created the New York police force as the first municipal police department in the country, historians record an immediate problem with extortion and other corrupt activities engaged in by police officers. Since that time, the New York police department has been the subject of numerous corruption scandals followed by investigations. In each case, the investigators turned up substantial evidence of corruption, which was greeted by public expressions of shock and outrage. While some reforms usually followed each of these periodic scandals, the basic pattern of corrupt behaviour was never substantially affected, and after the heat was off, it was largely back to business as usual'<sup>21</sup>.

### **Political Surveillance**

Apart from corruption and the use of deadly force, the most controversial area of police operations in the last decade has been political surveillance. Leading the way in this has been the FBI, although its wings were clipped at least temporarily by post-Watergate revelations of Hoover's involvement in the notorious 1970 Huston plan for an Inter-Agency Group on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security. The extent of FBI political intelligence operations is revealed in Table 2.

The targets of these operations are individuals and organisations variously designated by the FBI as 'extremist' (e.g., the Black Panthers, SLA, American Indian Movement, Ku Klux Klan) or 'subversive' (e.g., Communist Party USA, Students for a Democratic Society, Revolutionary Communist Party, Weathermen, Vietnam Veterans Against the War). Perhaps the most scandalous of the FBI operations in this area was COINTELPRO, revealed in 1971 when a group 'liberated' hundreds of documents from an FBI branch office. These 'Counter Intelligence and Special Operations' activities began in 1956 against the Communist Party USA, and were subsequently targeted on many other organisations. For example, cartoons were distributed in 1968-9 purporting to emanate from a rival black group depicting the lynching of Black Panther leaders<sup>22</sup>.

Local police are also heavily involved in covert political intelligence operations. In Los Angeles critics have shown that the police have used undercover agents to infiltrate and report on a number of peaceful groups including a Citizen's Commission on Police Repression, the American Civil Liberties Union, and environmental groups<sup>23</sup>.

Perhaps most sinister are the activities of a private group, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit founded in 1956. As a private organisation LEIU operates with

little government (let alone public) control or accountability. Former members in 1976 revealed its activities in infiltrating the American Indian Movement, framing two of its leaders on a murder charge, and spying on black activists, civil libertarians and politicians<sup>24</sup>.

There are disturbing signs that in the present resurgence of patriotism some of the constraints on the FBI and other political surveillance activities, which followed in the aftermath of Watergate, may be revoked. For example, Republican senators, associated with Ronald Reagan,<sup>25</sup> are seeking to introduce a Bill to restore the power of the FBI.

### Police Ineffectiveness

There are growing indications that traditional police tactics are ineffective in achieving their purported goal of reducing crime. Soaring crime rates are often used by police to bolster their case for more personnel, powers and technological aids. But the police research explosion which followed the post-1968 'war on crime' has called into question traditional policing methods.

In 1972 the Police Foundation initiated a 12-month controlled experiment in Kansas City to discover the consequences of differences in preventive patrolling. In matching sectors of the city three alternative forms of patrol were carried out: proactive,

**Table 2: FBI domestic intelligence work, 1974.**

Field Office	No of agents in office	% (no.) fulltime on domestic intelligence		No of domestic intell. cases
San Francisco	350	24	(86)	4,881
Los Angeles	497	12	(59)	4,026
New York	973	9	(82)	3,988
Chicago	361	10	(36)	1,795
Dist. of Columbia	70	4	(3)	962
Buffalo	81	10	(8)	883
Sacramento	93	12	(11)	842
San Diego	91	12	(11)	790
Springfield	80	4	(3)	772
Atlanta	132	11	(14)	720

Source: Comptroller-General's report to House Ctee on the Judiciary, *FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations. Their Purpose and Scope. Issues that need to be resolved.* GAO, Washington DC, 1976.

with a doubling of the number of cars per shift; reactive, with cars entering only in response to service calls and not engaging in any preventive patrol at all; and a control sector, with no change in the intensity of patrol. The results showed that variations in patrol style had no discernible effect on reported crime, arrest rates, victimisation rates based on special surveys, the public's fear of crime and attitudes to the police<sup>26</sup>. Another Police Foundation study, also in Kansas City, showed that the speed of notice response to calls, an obsession which has stimulated much of the investment in vehicle and communications technology of recent years, is largely irrelevant to reducing crime. Police cars arrive at the scene an average 3 minutes after a call from an assault victim, but typically the assault had not been reported until an hour after it had occurred. Similar patterns were found for robbery and burglary calls<sup>27</sup>.

Similarly, Rand Corporation studies of the criminal investigation process have revealed the haphazard nature of detective work. Unless the offender is named by the victim or a witness, chances of detection are very slim and depend more on luck or the criminal's bungling than on the investigator's skill. Peter Greenwood, director of the Rand Study, stated: 'It is a rare event when a property crime is solved through the clever piecing together of a fragile chain of evidence.' His analysis of New York City robbery cases showed that an arrest was made at or near the scene of the crime in nearly one robbery in ten. Of the others, police made an arrest in 46% of cases where the victim could name a suspect, but only 2% of the cases where they had nothing more than a description to go on<sup>28</sup>.

### (i) Internal reform attempts

The lawlessness and ineffectiveness of the American police have generated reform movements involving both internal reforms and struggles to subordinate the police to *external* democratic controls. Three main waves of reform by liberal administrators responded to periods of intense criticism of the police and to scandals<sup>29</sup>. The first cycle

of reform, between about 1890 and 1930, was led by commercial, civic and religious groups and emphasised a military mode of policing. It reflected the struggle for control of city governments between the political machines representing lower and middle-class ethics and the Progressive, reforming elites representing upper-class, advanced professional, and large business groups with a liberal strategy for stabilising the turmoil of rapidly expanding capitalism.

The second wave of police reform, from the '30s to the '50s, was initiated by the law enforcement community itself, and its watchword was 'professionalism'. Its leaders were such police chiefs as August Vollmer and Orlando Wilson, and the 'professional association' they established, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).

These two phases of the reform movement shared certain assumptions rejecting the 19th century legacy of policing. The police and other public agencies should provide the best possible services at the least possible cost, rather than constituting a channel of mobility for immigrants loyal to the party machine. Varying ethnic life-styles could not be permitted, and the criminal law should be used to enforce a uniform WASP morality. Above all, policing must be insulated from 'politics' and given a large measure of professional autonomy. Consequently, police departments were centralised and bureaucratised, and standards of personnel upgraded. Although about a third of city chiefs of police are still appointed by politicians (and county sheriffs are directly elected) most cities give the chief 'good behaviour' security of tenure, and the rank-and-file civil service protection. This has drastically changed the 19th century situation whereby police forces might be sacked and replaced *en masse* following a change in city government.

The third cycle of reforms came after the combination in the 1960s of liberal criticisms of police abuse and racism, and more general concern about police ineffectiveness in combatting crime. In general, reform efforts followed the lines of earlier phases: greater centralisation,

upgrading personnel, crimefighting and patrol technology, and improved community relations. While previous reformers held that the troubles of policing stemmed from political control, recent criticism has been levelled at the way that earlier reforms insulated the police from outside democratic control, and made them an autonomous and powerful political force in their own right.

The three waves of reform have failed to achieve their supposed goals of increasing police effectiveness in reducing crime, while eliminating police abuses. What they have succeeded in doing is remodelling and streamlining police organisation and technology, and upgrading personnel standards, although the subculture of policing itself has remained remarkably impervious to change.

### Women and minorities

Blacks are especially unrepresented in police work, as Table 3 shows. Women have also been excluded from police work. A 1971 Police Foundation study found that most departments had a quota for women of 2% or less (often not filled)<sup>32</sup>. Of these women police few did regular patrol.

In 1972 Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to apply to public agencies including police departments. This

bars police organisations from 'discriminating on the basis of race, creed, colour, sex or national origins.' Subsequent court decisions have been directed at increasing the representation of minority personnel and women police.<sup>33</sup> Selection criteria and procedures have been amended, and the proportion of black and women police recruits substantially increased. In Chicago, for example, a 1975 court order required the department to hire 200 black and female officers. By 1975, 400 women were on patrol in New York City, and most cities had some women on patrol. One 1976 recruit class was 24% black and 29% female. However, recent layoffs of police personnel due to financial restrictions have disproportionately hit women and minorities who lacked seniority. There has also been substantial resistance to increasing the proportion of women and minority police from white policemen and their representative bodies<sup>34</sup>.

### (ii) External control attempts

As outlined above, one of the major thrusts of police reform and 'professionalisation' in the early 20th century was to insulate departments from the pattern of local political control which prevailed in the 19th century. In the 1960s the resulting police autonomy became the target of criticism from black and civil liberties groups.

**Table 3: Black Police in Key Cities 1973**

Cities	%Black	%Black Police	In New York City
Washington	71.1	35.9	While more than 31% of NYC's populations is black or Puerto Rican, only 8% of policemen are from these 2 groups. As one progresses up through the ranks the incidence of racial discrimination becomes more blatant. While 9.4% of patrolmen and detectives are from minority groups, only 4.66% of sergeants, 2.61% of lieutenants and 1.4% of captains are. <i>New York Times</i> , Feb. 12th 1973.
Baltimore	46.4	13.0	
New Orleans	45.0	6.1	
Wilmington, Del.	43.6	11.5	
Birmingham, Ala.	42.0	1.9	
St. Louis, Mo.	40.9	14.0	
Cleveland	38.3	7.7	
Pittsburgh, Pa.	20.2	6.4	
Dallas Tex.	24.9	1.9	
Los Angeles	17.9	5.2	
Boston	16.3	2.1	

Source: S. Bernstein et al., *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove*, Berkeley: Centre for Research on Criminal Justice, 2nd ed. 1977, p.71.

Attempts to reassert civilian control of the police in this decade took two basic forms: (i) *Legal system controls*. The supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren handed down a series of decisions extending the scope of the 'exclusionary rule' whereby illegally acquired evidence is treated as inadmissible. In *Mapp v. Ohio* 1961 the Supreme Court held that the Rule applied to all the states, not only to federal criminal trials. The decisions in *Gideon v. Wainwright* 1963, *Escobedo v. Illinois* 1964, *Miranda v. Arizona* 1966, and *Argersinger v. Hamlin* 1972 cumulatively made more effective the right to counsel and the right to silence<sup>35</sup>. All these decisions were intended to control police abuse by removing the incentive to violate suspects' rights in order to secure a conviction. Studies of police questioning subsequent to the Miranda decision suggest that the verdict had little impact in practice, for all the virulent attacks on it by police and conservatives complaining that it 'handcuffed the cops'<sup>36</sup>. In recent years the more conservative Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger has chipped away at some of the restrictions on police abuse developed in the 1960s<sup>37</sup>. Liberals too have tended to become somewhat disenchanted with the exclusionary rule and court overview as a device for controlling police misconduct. Not only is it a blunt and probably ineffective instrument, but the adverse publicity given cases where 'the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered' (as Cardozo put it) weakens general support for civil liberties<sup>38</sup>.

(ii) *Civilian review* In response to pressure for public accountability from civil rights and civil liberties groups several cities established civilian review boards in the 1960s: Philadelphia, New York, Rochester, Los Angeles, Denver, Cincinnati, Seattle, Detroit, Newark, Hartford, Baltimore, San Francisco and others<sup>39</sup>. By 1976 the only one that was intact was Berkeley's police Review Commission, established by popular referendum in 1973 to review complaints and police policy. Radical critics suggest that it has not been successful in altering law enforcement priorities as

distinct from redressing some grievances against individual officers<sup>40</sup>. The other boards set up during the '60s were all quickly destroyed by the opposition of rank-and-file police organisations backed up by conservative politicians who succeeded in overcoming the liberal city government and police chiefs' support for civilian review<sup>41</sup>. The police campaign relied on exploitation of the white public's fear of crime, black protest and radicalism. The police victories emphasised the extent to which the police had become a powerful, relatively autonomous political force<sup>42</sup>.

The more radical demand for community control of the police has been raised through the initiatives of black and student groups, and aims to subordinate the police to local democratic control. The Berkeley proposal calling for direct control of the police by locally elected councils in neighbourhood districts, was defeated in a referendum campaign in 1971. None of the other community control campaigns, such as those in Chicago and Milwaukee, got as far as a referendum<sup>43</sup>.

However, recently liberals in Los Angeles have gained control of the city council and the Police Commission (the board, selected by the mayor, which supervises the police department). This was a consequence of social change in the city, notably the strongly organised black and gay communities, and the movement of more conservative, middle-class whites to the suburbs. The black mayor, Bradley, an ex-policeman elected in 1973, appointed liberals to the police commission. The result has been increasingly astringent conflicts between the Commission and Council on one side, and the once politically dominant police department on the other, over issues like the police use of deadly force, racism, harassment of gays, political spying, and the police budget<sup>44</sup>. This use of existing political structures seems a promising future line for attempts to control the police, where local political configurations are so inclined.

#### **Police unions' resistance to reforms**

Police unions representing the rank-and-file have become a major force resisting liberal



changes. They reflect the contradictory character of the police officer's position as both an employee, and a potential source of unreliability as an agent of state control. Police unions in the US emerged out of fraternal and benevolent associations formed in the late 19th century. In 1917 many of these organisations sought American Federation of Labour charters, but the incipient police union movement was smashed by the image of 'anarchy' associated with the Boston police strike of September 1919.

In the 1960s local police associations became politicised as a response to the Supreme Court's decisions and the movement for a civilian review<sup>46</sup>. The real sign of the considerable political muscle of the police was the 1965 struggle over the New York City Civilian Review Board, in which the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association successfully defeated the board in a referendum campaign, even though the board was supported by Mayor Lindsay, Senators Kennedy and Javits, Commissioner Leary and most of the (then liberal) political establishment. Since then police associations have continued to be active and powerful forces in endorsing and campaigning for right-wing political candidates, monitoring the sentencing policies of judges (and using this record when the judges run for re-election) and resisting policies aimed at curbing police abuse. At the same time, police unions have become far more militant in economic bargaining, with 127 work stoppages between 1966-9.

There are 5 main types of police organisation: (i) Police-only local organisations like the New York Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. The vast majority of police belong to these. Many are affiliated to the International Conference of Police Associations, with over 100 member bodies in the US and Canada. (ii) The Fraternal Order of Police is (after ICPA) the largest national police association, with over 900,000 members in 800 lodges throughout the US. Like the local associations, FOP lodges have grown most rapidly in the last two decades and are

increasingly militant both on political and economic issues. (iii) The International Association of Chiefs of Police represents about 8,000 command level police, and has been the main agent of 'professionalisation' since its foundation in 1893. It too has grown most rapidly recently, with a tripling of membership 1961-9, and an annual budget over \$2.5 million. In 1976, the big-city police chiefs organised the Police Executive Research Forum, criticising the IACP for being over-sensitive to the majority of its members who headed small police forces. PERF which is strongly linked with the liberal national police establishment of LEAA and the Police Foundation, castigated IACP for having become a fetter upon further professionalisation. IACP is also in financial trouble because its LEAA grant has been suspended pending investigations for fraud. (iv) About 15% of police belong to locals affiliated with national labour unions, mainly the Teamsters and the AFSCME (government employees). Although still relatively small (about 15,000) police membership of the Teamsters is growing due to an aggressive organising campaign. (v) Black police organisations have been formed in the last decade, in response to the racism of departments in both policing operations and in recruitment and promotion policy. Such black organisations as the New York Guardians or the Chicago Afro-American Patrolman's Association have become a countervailing power to the reactionary activities of white police groups. In 1976 more than 60 senior black police officers formed the National Organisation of Black Police Executives (NOBLE). Recently NOBLE has emerged as an outspoken force condemning police racism as manifested for example in the use of deadly force<sup>47</sup>.

### Conclusion

The police forces of the US have grown rapidly and become more centralised in the last decade and a half, as a response to political turbulence and increasing crime and social dislocation. At the same time, police abuse and ineffectiveness have become increasingly controversial political

issues. Rank-and-file organisations have become powerful forces opposing liberal reforms, although the small but growing bodies of black police provide some resistance to this.

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## BOOKS

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### REVIEWS & SOURCES

**AMBUSH AT TULLY-WEST**, by Kennedy Lindsay. Dunrod Press, Brown's Rd., Co. Antrim, Northern Ireland, 263pp, £4.95 pbk, £9.95hbk.

The core of this book concerns two cases of illegal activity by the security forces in Northern Ireland; one, the persecution of a man and his family because he complained at illegal activities by the British Army; the other, the systematic torture and ill-treatment of a man by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in an attempt to make him confess to murder and membership of an illegal organisation. Readers may be wondering what makes any two such

incidents worthy of a book; it is now generally realised that covert military operations — sometimes illegal — must form part of any anti-guerilla campaign, and the British Government has itself admitted, in the Bennett Report, that the RUC ill-treats suspects to extract confessions (see *Bulletin* no 11).

One difference is that both the victims and the author are Unionists. The author was a Unionist member of the 1973 Northern Ireland Assembly, and the 1975 Constitutional Convention. The book serves as a reminder of the extent to which those who believe the official British Government story — that operations in Northern Ireland are intended to support 'law and order' — are shocked when the record of security forces' illegality is exposed.

Superficially it is strange that the

persecution of William Black, a former member of the Ulster Defence Regiment, who was the target of the assassination attempt from which the book takes its title, did not attract more attention in this country. After all, it could hardly be dismissed as Republican propaganda. Black saw British soldiers stealing cars from a Protestant district; he reported the incident, and was subsequently dismissed from the UDR. A neighbour's house was machine-gunned evidently in mistake for his, and finally, he was ambushed and seriously wounded by a gang of men, one carrying a silenced machine gun, at his holiday cottage at Tully-West. The author indicates that the SAS were responsible, and that Black was the victim of a campaign of intimidation by the Army.

The general political point is that though the author supports the continuation of N. Ireland's links with Britain, he does not believe that covert, violent and illegal means are right or necessary in maintaining them. But he does not examine the origins of this deep paradox of 'law and order' maintained by illegality and violence. The book should be read, despite its political failings, as further disturbing evidence of the wide gap between the reality of Northern Ireland and the official and media version.

**THE CIVIL SERVANTS: An Inquiry into Britain's Ruling Class, by Peter Kellner & Lord Crowther-Hunt. London: Macdonald General Books, 1980. 352pp., £9.95.**

In June 1968 Prime Minister Wilson announced that the recommendations of the Fulton Report on reform of the civil service were to be implemented. The changes would make Whitehall both professional and accountable. The cult of the general amateur was doomed. Parliament would become arbiter of all things in government. Nothing changed. This book, the latest in a series of studies (Crossman, Benn, etc) shows how reform was effectively blocked by the mandarins under Sir William Armstrong. It also shows

why this should be so: Whitehall has ceased to dispose when ministers propose. The constitutional model has collapsed. Instead civil servants, confident they know what is best for Britain, often make policy instead of implementing it. This leads them to cultivate secrecy and to employ a recruiting policy which perpetuates their own elite. Meanwhile parliament has no means to scrutinise the executive powers of the civil service.

Mrs Thatcher now proposes to cut civil service numbers to 630,000, the lowest number since 1939. Watch this space.

**THE VELVET CHANCELLORS, A History of Post-War Germany, by Terence Prittie, Frederick Muller Ltd London, 1979, 286pp, £8.95.**

West Germany, the title means, and for it "the main problem can be summarised as how to be a great power without scaring everybody else into an anti-German coalition" (Dan Smith). Prittie's promotion of West Germany as **Guardian** correspondent and author of five books of apologetics for Germany earned him a Federal Cross of Merit. The present book tells us that "all five post-war Chancellors have . . . represented the antithesis of that 'blood and iron' tradition embodied in Otto von Bismarck and . . . Hitler." Prittie, a right-wing aristocrat, is a loyal NATO propagandist who attacks the Brandt governments **Ostpolitik** (which recognised East Germany, opened diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe and led on to a European Security Conference and the Helsinki Agreement) as "creating a false sense of security" and leading to "increasing military inferiority" (sic) of the West. He restates the old revanchist claim that West Germany is "the only legitimate representative of the German people as a whole". Dedicated to what he calls "better understanding between the German and British peoples", the book fails to show that the reasons why the West German leadership of Europe is mistrusted are 'misunderstandings'.

**THE COUNTERFORCE SYNDROME. A guide to US Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine, by Robert C. Aldridge, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D.C., 2nd ed, 1979, 86pp.**

Lockheed employed the author on design of Polaris missiles, on MIRVs for Poseidon (which replaced Polaris in the US) and on the design of Trident missiles. In the course of this last job he (finally) realised that the missile was being designed to destroy 'hardened' missile sites. This does not make sense unless the US is building the capability for an effective 'first-strike' which would in one attack wipe out *all* of the Soviet Union's missiles thereby preventing retaliation and 'winning' the irradiated remains of Soviet cities. Aldridge thinks that 'if that first-strike capability materializes, we can expect nuclear weapons to be used in some way before the year 2000... All of these first-strike programs will be in or near production by 1982 or 1983' among them: Trident missiles which are to replace Polaris as Britain's independent (ha ha) nuclear deterrent, and the Cruise missiles that the December 1979 NATO summit decided to locate here by the end of 1983! If you do not know the technical mumbo-jumbo about these issues, this is the best treatment available, being both readable and accurate. Absolutely essential reading.

**RESPECTABLE REBELS. Middle class campaigns in Britain in the 1970s. Roger King and Neill Nugent (eds). Hodder & Stoughton (London), 200pp, £5.95.**

A rather drab and unoriginal account of various right wing groups. These include ratepayers and self-employed organisations, National Association For Freedom, Mary Whitehouse's National Viewers and Listeners Association and the National Festival of Light. The general approach is that these militant organisations represent a disenchantment with the Conservative Party as the true aspiration of middle class politics. It is thus an historical account of a trend in British politics predating the Thatcher government. Useful as a starting point for sources.

**The Technology of Political Control, by C. Ackroyd, K. Margolis, J. Rosenhead & T. Shallice, 2nd edn, Pluto Press, London, 1980, 336pp, £3.25.**

The re-issue of this 1977 book with a new introduction, afterword and sources is a welcome contribution to growing public understanding of recent changes in the methods and ideology of state repression. Though the authors characterize these changes as the growth of a 'strong state', the increasing use of these technologies might reflect the political weaknesses of the state as much as its strength. Be that as it may, the new technologies of repression are being introduced, and this survey provides a wealth of information with which to challenge the growth of the iron fist.

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## PAMPHLETS

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**THE POLICE, THE LAW AND THE PEOPLE, by Nick Blake, published by the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers, 14 Parkfield Rd, London NW10. 75p.**  
Barrister Nick Blake wrote this important pamphlet as a contribution to the debate on police powers, and in answer to Metropolitan Commissioner McNee's submission to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP). Arguing that the philosophy of policing by consent is being eroded by a tendency for the police to assume greater powers, Blake examines their current practice. He discusses police powers on the street, including the 'Sus' law, stop-and-search procedures, the role of the Special Patrol Group and computer surveillance; police powers after arrest, including coercion of suspects and breaches of Judges' Rules; and the way the judiciary accommodates police malpractice. Point by point, Blake counters McNee's arguments for increased legal powers by showing that the police consistently abuse those they already have. Blake concludes that there is an urgent need for the police to be made democratically accountable.

## ARMAMENTS OR DISARMAMENT?

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Brochure, from SIPRI, Svevagen 116, S-113 46, Stockholm, Sweden. This pamphlet draws on material in **World Armaments and Disarmament**, SIPRI Yearbook 1980. It is a useful summary of information about the international arms build-up, with particular reference to nuclear weapons. It predicts an acceleration in the 1980s of the militarisation of the earth, the oceans and outer space. Tables and diagrams give statistics on such subjects as world military expenditure, the arms trade — especially to the third world, current strategic nuclear power reactors. The pamphlet explains the significance of the SALT II treaty for limiting strategic nuclear arms, but concludes that there can be no satisfactory alternative to disarmament. Recommended.

**WHO PREVENTS CRIME? — a brief review of the complex problem of crime management**, by John Wheeler MP, Conservative Political Centre. 70p. Home Secretary Whitelaw's introduction to this pamphlet calls on 'the people of Britain' to assist the agencies of law enforcement. Focusing on minor offenders, Wheeler argues the case for short sharp shock treatment. Other suggestions for crime management include introducing stop-and-search powers for the police, and more restrictive public order provisions. In other words, the way we assist the police is by surrendering our civil liberties.

**THE EFFECT OF THE POLICE ON CRIME**, by James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, US Dept of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). An examination of varying police practices and their effect on robbery rates in 35 large US cities. The authors' statistical analyses reveal that large numbers of police officers do not necessarily reduce robbery rates; rather, an 'aggressive patrol' strategy where the police intervene and observe frequently and overtly appears to be more effective. Interesting as an example of the type of research supported by LEAA.

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## ARTICLES

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### *Criminal Procedure*

Police powers and 1984

Jack Davidson

Crann Tara No 9

Analysis of the Scottish Criminal Justice Bill

### *Emergency Planning*

Nuclear attack — there's a job for private security, Peter Evans, Security Gazette, June 1980. A neglected aspect of home defence planning examined by the home affairs correspondent of *The Times*.

Warcop. Manchester City Enquirer 51, 26 July 1980. The founder of Manchester police's SPG has become the city's chief of emergency planning.

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Civil liberties in Ireland 1970-80, Joe Costello, Hibernia, 26 June 1980. Review of the past decade in the south by a member of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties.

British spies in Ireland/Information for sale/Setting spy against spy, David McKittrick, Irish Times, 22, 23, 24 April 1980. British secret service operations north and south.

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Keep politics out of the police service, James Jardine, Police, June 1980. Police Federation chairman attacks demands for greater accountability.

How South Yorkshire's budget missed the bus, Police, May 1980. Local Authority attempts to cut police spending.

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The frightening cost of complaints against the police, Robert Traini, Security Gazette, June

1980. Attack on the complaints system, based on survey of chief constables' views.

Can the Red Knight slay the Blue Dragon, Police, August 1980. An attack on the Lambeth councillors who called for the withdrawal of the SPG.

The Councillors who want to run the police force, Police, August 1980. Examines the demands for local councillors to control police operations.

#### *Police: operations*

This is all very nice but let's get back to doing what we're paid for, Ralph Fusco, Police Review, 11 July 1980. A police officer attacks 'community policing'.

Liaison between the police and HM Customs and Excise, J.F. Lyne and R.L. Brown, Police Review, 13 June 1980. Two West Midlands officers go through the powers.

Armed crime is changing the nature of policing, James Jardine, Police, July 1980. Federation chairman reviews trends in modern policing.

Policing the news media, Dave Clark, Leveller 39, July 1980. Get-together of the Association of Chief Police Officers and Fleet Street editors.

Who is really on the rampage? Mike Phillips, New Statesman, 27 June 1980. Relations between police and black communities.

The South Yorkshire Steel Strike, James Brownlow, Police, July 1980. Chief constable reviews police operations and tactics.

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A question of ethics, Erl Annesley, Police Review, 20 June 1980. Argues in favour of breaching medical confidentiality to assist police.

Where have all the bobbies gone? Brian Hilliard, Police Review, 22 August 1980. Asks if too many police are at the centre and too few on the ground.

The Community Constable Program in West Yorkshire, Daniel J. McKane (Detroit Police Dept) Police Studies, Spring 1980. An American view of a British 'experiment'.

Strategies against Crime in Europe, John Brown, Police Review, 12 September 1980. A report on the 1980 Cranfield Institute of Technology Conference.

#### *Police: organisation*

Report from the Federation conference, Brian Hilliard, Police Review, 30 May 1980.

Speak for yourself: Essex, Brian Hilliard, Police Review, 30 May 1980. This and the following article form part of an occasional series on individual forces.

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A policeman in Surrey, Brian Hilliard, Police Review, 25 July 1980. Interview with Surrey chief constable, Peter Matthews.

Loss of control? Martin Kettle, New Society, 7 August 1980. Discusses new moves towards amalgamation of police forces or regional basis.

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Anatomy of a riot, Police, May 1980. Reprints in full the government's official version of what happened in Bristol.

To ban or not to ban? George Terry, Police, June 1980. Full text of controversial speech on public order and riot control by chief constable of Sussex.

CRS: It's more than just a bunch of 'heavies', Police, July 1980. Reassuring reading for Federation members about French riot police.

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The spies who spend what they like/Jock Kane's story, Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 16 May 1980. Dirty tricks at GCHQ's Hong Kong station: the insider's story.

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